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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Dr. Karen Malleus appeals the final order of 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granting John J. George, Jill M. Hackman, and 
Jeffrey A. Conrad’s motion to dismiss Malleus’s 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim that they violated her Fourteenth Amendment 
privacy rights.  For the reasons discussed below, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 Malleus was a school board member for the Warwick 
School District.  George and Hackman were also members of 
the school board.  Conrad was the head of the Warwick 
Republican Party, and later a candidate for the school board. 
 In 2006, a student within the Warwick School District 
(“Reporting Student”) reported that she had seen a teacher 
(“Teacher”) hugging a minor student (“Minor Student”).  
Immediately after witnessing the incident, the Reporting 
Student told her substitute teacher about it.  That evening the 
Reporting Student explained to her parents what she had seen.  
They then had her call her great-aunt, Malleus.  Over the next 
few days, the Reporting Student and her parents met with 
various school administrators.  The school and school district 
subsequently conducted an investigation into the Reporting 
Student’s claim. 
 During the subsequent investigation Malleus shared 
credibility concerns about the Reporting Student, 
volunteering advice to various administrators that they should 
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have more evidence before disciplining the Teacher based on 
the account given by the Reporting Student.  She raised these 
concerns with other members of the school board, the 
school’s administration, and the school’s faculty.  Malleus did 
so because the allegations against the Teacher were serious, 
and she questioned the accuracy of those allegations.  The 
investigation into the incident ended when the Teacher and 
the Minor Student denied the allegations.  The Teacher 
received a warning that the allegations were serious and that, 
had they been true, the Teacher would have been terminated. 
 In 2008, a police officer encountered the Minor 
Student and the Teacher engaging in sexual activity.  The 
Teacher was arrested.  Subsequently, the school board 
conducted its own investigation into the 2006 incident. 
 Malleus agreed to cooperate with the investigation 
because the attorney conducting the investigation told her that 
the report would remain confidential, and the school board 
expressed that the report would be confidential.  In an 
interview, she repeated her opinion that the Reporting Student 
has a vivid imagination and a history of exaggerating her 
conclusions about others’ conduct. 
 The final report detailed Malleus’s interjection into the 
2006 investigation.  Malleus viewed the report as unfair, and 
she was upset with its conclusions; however, she believed it 
would remain confidential. 
 In the run up to the 2008 school board election, George 
and Hackman leaked a copy of the report to Conrad, who 
subsequently provided it to the press.  Local papers released 
 5 
articles based on the report.  Malleus alleges that these 
articles caused reputational harm, family problems, loss of 
emotional peace of mind, and loss of income. 
 Malleus filed a § 1983 claim against George, 
Hackman, and Conrad for violating her right to privacy.  She 
claimed to have had a constitutionally protected expectation 
of privacy in the report under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because she had revealed her opinion about her grand-niece 
for a limited purpose and with the expectation that it would be 
kept secret.  The District Court dismissed the complaint under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), ruling it failed to state a claim 
because the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect that type 
of communication. 
 Malleus filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Malleus argues that the District Court erred in 
dismissing her § 1983 claim.  The District Court held that 
Malleus failed to plead that a right secured by the 
Constitution had been violated.  See Barna v. City of Perth 
Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 815 (3d Cir. 1994).  Malleus argues that 
her Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy was violated 
when her opinion about her grand-niece’s truthfulness was 
disclosed by George, Hackman, and Conrad. 
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 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss.  AT&T v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 
470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006).  When reviewing a motion 
to dismiss, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint must be 
accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of 
every favorable inference to be drawn therefrom.”  Kulwicki 
v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992).  A motion to 
dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007). 
 To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court 
must take three steps.  First, the court must “tak[e] note of the 
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009).  Second, the court should 
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”  Id. 
at 1950.  Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 
for relief.”  Id.  This means that our inquiry is normally 
broken into three parts:  (1) identifying the elements of the 
claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory 
allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded 
components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of 




 For a plaintiff to recover under § 1983, she must 
establish that the defendant acted under color of state law to 
deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution.  
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Barna, 42 F.3d at 815.  
The right that Malleus claims is protected by the Constitution 
is the right to share one’s opinion about other individuals 
privately.  For purposes of Twombly analysis, we must first 
establish that this is a right secured by the Constitution; if 
there is no constitutional right, it does not matter what facts 
have been provided as there can be no § 1983 claim. 
 Generally, Fourteenth Amendment constitutional 
privacy is limited to information about oneself.  To the extent 
that the right applies to information about others, it is limited 
to one’s decision not to share that information. 
To begin with, both the common law and the 
literal understandings of privacy encompass the 
individual’s control of information concerning 
his or her person.  In an organized society, there 
are few facts that are not at one time or another 
divulged to another.  Thus the extent of the 
protection accorded a privacy right at common 
law rested in part on the degree of 
dissemination of the allegedly private fact and 
the extent to which the passage of time rendered 
it private.  According to Webster’s initial 
definition, information may be classified as 
“private” if it is “intended for or restricted to the 
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use of a particular person or group or class of 
persons: not freely available to the public.” 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764-65 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
 Traditionally, the Fourteenth Amendment has 
protected two types of privacy rights.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 
430 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2005).  First, it protects “the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.”  Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  This category 
protects against disclosure of certain personal information, 
including:  information containing specific “details of one’s 
personal life,” id. at 121; Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 
946 F.2d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 1991), information “which the 
individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the private 
enclave where he may lead a private life,” and information 
containing “intimate facts of a personal nature.”  United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks and citation in footnote 
omitted).  Second, it protects “the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions.”  C.N., 430 F.3d 
at 178 (quoting Whalen 429 U.S. at 599).  This category of 
“important decisions” has not been extended beyond “matters 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education.”  
Westinghouse, 638 F.3d at 577 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).  The first category is a right to 
confidentiality, and the second category is a right to 
autonomy.  See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 n.5 (3d Cir. 
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2001).  As it is unclear which category of privacy Malleus is 
claiming, we will analyze her claim under both prongs. 
 This first type of privacy right is the right recognized 
in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 
“the right to be let alone.”  277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).  “[T]he 
right not to have intimate facts concerning one’s life disclosed 
without one’s consent” is “a venerable [right] whose 
constitutional significance we have recognized in the past.”  
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 
Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 401-02 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
“In determining whether information is entitled to privacy 
protection, we have looked at whether it is within an 
individual’s reasonable expectations of confidentiality.  The 
more intimate or personal the information, the more justified 
is the expectation that it will not be subject to public 
scrutiny.”  Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 
812 F.2d 105, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1987) (“FOP”).  We have 
deemed the following types of information to be protected: a 
private employee’s medical information when sought by the 
government, Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577; medical, 
financial and behavioral information relevant to a police 
investigator’s ability to work in dangerous and stressful 
situations, FOP, 812 F.2d at 113, 115-16; a public 
employee’s medical prescription record, Doe v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Trans. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“SEPTA”); a minor student’s pregnancy status, Gruenke v. 
Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (3d Cir. 2000); sexual orientation, 
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 
2000); and an inmate’s HIV-positive status, Delie, 257 F.3d 
at 317, 323.  This information consists of three categories: 
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sexual information, Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196, medical 
information, SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1139, and some financial 
information, Paul P., 170 F.3d at 402.  While this is not an 
exhaustive list, it is clear that the privacy right is limited to 
facts and an individual’s interest in not disclosing those facts 
about himself or herself.  It is the right to refrain from sharing 
intimate facts about oneself. 
 The information for which Malleus is claiming a 
privacy right meets none of these criteria.  She may not have 
intended wide-dissemination of her opinion but she 
volunteered it to others, including the attorney who drafted 
the “confidential” report.  The information was voluntarily 
shared, non-intimate (it was not relating to sexuality, medical 
records, or financial information), an opinion rather than fact, 
and about someone else.  Malleus lacks a constitutional right 
to privacy under the first category. 
 The second type of privacy right is the right to 
autonomy and independence in personal decision-making.  
Cases in this category describe the liberty interests in matters 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and parental child rearing and education 
decisions.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) 
(parents’ rights to make decisions concerning care and 
custody of children); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right 
to abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom 
to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(right to marital privacy in use of contraceptives); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents’ right to teach 
own children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right 
to teach foreign language). 
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 The decision of a school board member to participate 
in an investigation into how a sexual assault investigation had 
been handled, while an important matter, does not implicate 
the kinds of interests recognized by the foregoing cases.  The 
decision of an individual, in either her role as a school board 
member or in her role as a great-aunt, to share her opinion 
cannot be compared to the fundamental and life altering 
decisions where courts have recognized a privacy right for 
independent personal decision-making. 
 As Malleus has no claim under either of the recognized 
tests for Fourteenth Amendment privacy, she argues instead 
for a third, unrecognized type of privacy.  She argues that if 
someone shares his or her opinion about someone else, with 
the expectation that that opinion will be kept secret, then the 
opinion must be kept confidential.  We have not previously 
recognized a third category of Fourteenth Amendment 
privacy, and we decline to do so now.
1
 
 Courts have explained how limited the privacy right is. 
[T]he federal constitution . . . protects against 
public disclosure only [of] highly personal 
matters representing the most intimate aspect of 
human affairs.  Indeed, the constitutional right 
                                                 
1
 We recognize that there are other constitutionally 
protected rights that can be said to involve privacy concerns, 
such as the right to practice one’s religion, which is protected 
by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 64 (1976).  However, Malleus has only brought her 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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of privacy, which courts have been reluctant to 
expand, shields from public scrutiny only that 
information which involves deeply rooted 
notions of fundamental personal interests 
derived from the Constitution.  In this respect, 
the federal right of privacy is significantly 
narrower than the right of privacy protected by 
state tort law. 
Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Were our circuit to 
apply the broadest test for privacy accepted in any of our 
sister circuits, Malleus’s opinion would still not be 
constitutionally protected.  In the Eighth Circuit, “to violate [a 
person’s] constitutional right of privacy, the information 
disclosed must be either a shocking degradation or an 
egregious humiliation of her to further some specific state 
interest, or a flagrant breech [sic] of a pledge of 
confidentiality which was instrumental in obtaining the 
personal information.”  Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 
1350 (8th Cir. 1993).  The information that Malleus shared, 
while potentially embarrassing, could not cause a “shocking 
degradation” or an “egregious humiliation.”  Id. 
 As there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy 
for the type of information in this case, Malleus cannot state a 
claim under § 1983.  We will affirm the decision of the 
District Court granting George, Hackman, and Conrad’s 
motion to dismiss. 
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IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court. 
